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Forty years ago economists discovered the “residual.” The main message of 
this literature, that growth in conventional inputs explains little of the observed 
growth in output, was first articulated by Solomon Fabricant in 1954 and em- 
phasized further by  Moses Abramovitz (1956), John Kendrick (1956), and 
Robert Solow (1957).’ The pioneers of  this subject were quite clear that this 
finding of  large residuals was an embarrassment, at best “a measure of  our 
ignorance” (Abramovitz, 1956 p. 11). But by attributing it to technical change 
and other sources of improved efficiency they turned it, perhaps inadvertently, 
from a gap in our understanding into an intellectual asset, a method for measur- 
ing “technical change.” Still, it was not a comfortable situation, and a subse- 
quent literature developed trying to “explain” this residual, or more precisely, 
to attribute it to particular sources (Griliches, 1960, 1963a,b, 1964; Edward 
Denison, 1962; Dale Jorgenson and Griliches, 1967). The consensus of  that 
literature was  that, while measurement errors may  play a significant role in 
such numbers, they could not really explain them away. The major sources of 
productivity growth were seen as coming from improvements in the quality of 
labor and capital and from other, not otherwise measured, sources of efficiency 
and technical change, the latter being in turn the product of formal and infor- 
mal R&D investments by  individuals, firms, and governments, and  of  the 
largely unmeasured contributions of science and other spillovers.  The prescrip- 
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1. The message itself was not exactly new. With hindsight, it is visible in the earlier work of Jan 
Tinbergen  (1942),  George  Stigler  (1947),  Glen  Barton  and  Martin  Cooper  (1948),  Jacob 
Schmookler (1952), and Vernon Ruttan (1954, 1956). See Griliches (1996) for a more detailed 
account of these developments. 
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tion of additional investments in education, in science, and in industrial R&D 
followed from this reading of history as did also the hope and expectation that 
the recently observed rates of  “technical change” would continue into the 
future. 
This general view of the sources of growth was put into doubt by the events 
of the 1970s and 1980s. Beginning in 1974 (or perhaps already in 1968) pro- 
ductivity growth slowed down significantly in the United States and abroad, 
and it has not fully recovered yet, at least as far as national aggregates are 
concerned. The many explanations that were offered for these events were not 
very convincing (see e.g., Denison, 1979; Martin Baily and Robert Gordon, 
1988; Griliches, 1988). As time went on and the direct effects of the energy- 
price shocks wore off but the expected recovery did not come or came only 
weakly, more voices were heard arguing that the slowdown might not be tem- 
porary; that the energy-price shocks just revealed what was already there-a 
decline in the underlying trend of technical change in the world economy; that 
the growth opportunities that had opened up in the late 1930s and had been 
interrupted by World War I1 have been exhausted, reflecting perhaps the com- 
pletion of  an even longer cycle, going back to the beginnings of this century 
(see e.g., Alfred Kleinknecht, 1987; Gordon, 1993a). Even more ominously, 
the slowdown was blamed on diminishing returns to science and technology 
in general and on the onset of widespread socioeconomic sclerosis (see e.g., 
William Nordhaus, 1972, 1989; Mancur Olson, 1982; F.  M. Scherer,  1983, 
1986; Robert Evenson, 1984; Baily and A. K. Chakrabarti, 1988). 
This is a rather pessimistic view of our current situation, and I would like to 
argue that the observed facts do not really support it. But that will not be easy, 
both because some of the “facts” are contradictory and because our measure- 
ment and observational tools are becoming increasingly inadequate in the con- 
text of  our changing economy. Nevertheless, I will review some of  the evi- 
dence for such views and argue with their interpretation. There are several 
possibilities here: (i) this view is true and that is sad; (ii) it is not true and 
recovery is around the comer if not already underway; (iii) it may be true, but 
whatever is or is not happening has little to do with diminishing returns to 
science or industrial R&D. Or, (iv) it may be that we just do not know. As is 
the case with global warming, we may not have an adequate understanding of 
the mechanisms producing growth or adequate data to adjudicate whether there 
has or has not been an underlying trend shift. If that is true, as is most likely, 
the question arises as to why we don’t know more after years of research done 
by so many good people. What is it about our data and data acquisition struc- 
ture, and possibly also our intellectual framework, that prevents us from mak- 
ing more progress on this topic? 
In discussing this range of topics, I will concentrate primarily on the R&D 
component of  this story-not  because it can explain much of the productivity 
slowdown (it cannot), and not just because this is where I have done most of 
my recent work, but because it illustrates rather well the major point I want to 349  Productivity, R&D, and  the Data Constraint 
make here tonight: that our understanding of what is happening in our econ- 
omy (and in the world economy) is constrained by  the extent and quality of 
the available data. I will also allude briefly to similar issues which arise in 
interpreting the productivity contribution of computers in the economy. Paral- 
lel tales about data constraining our understanding could also be told about 
other potential productivity-slowdown villains: energy-price shocks, insuffi- 
cient investment in physical capital, and possible declines in human-capital 
investments. Having reached the verdict of “not proven,” largely on account of 
insufficient evidence, I shall make a number of more general remarks on the 
state of our data and the possible reasons for it. The major message that I will 
be trying to convey is that we often misinterpret the available data because of 
inadequate attention to how they are produced and that the same inattention by 
us to the sources of  our data helps explain why progress is so slow. It is not 
just the measurement of productivity that is affected. Other fields of empirical 
economics are also struggling against the limitations imposed by the available 
data. Great advances have been made in theory and in econometric techniques, 
but these will be wasted unless they are applied to the right data. 
14.1  The “Facts” 
There are three sets of “facts” to look at: what has happened to productivity, 
what has happened to investment in R&D and science, and what has happened 
to the relationship between them. Sometime in the late 1960s measured pro- 
ductivity growth in the United States started to slow down. After a mild recov- 
ery in the early 1970s, the world economy was hit by two successive oil-price 
shocks which dropped economic growth rates in most of the developed econo- 
mies to levels significantly below those experienced in the 1960s and early 
1970s.  While the effects of the oil-price shocks wore off and real energy prices 
declined to close to their earlier levels, productivity growth rates did not re- 
cover much. At this point, and also somewhat earlier, many observers started 
wondering whether something more fundamental than just an energy-price- 
shock-induced business cycle was afoot. Standing in the early 1980s and look- 
ing back at the recent past, one would have observed a decline in total patents 
granted in the United States beginning in the early 1970s and a decline in the 
share of GNP being devoted to industrial R&D starting in the mid- 1960s, the 
timing  looking  suspiciously appropriate for  declining productivity growth 
rates 5-10  years later. One could also see a continuous and womsome decline 
in the number of patents received per corporate R&D dollar (see below). But 
there were also many other events clouding this picture, making one wonder 
whether faltering R&D and scientific efforts are really the culprits behind our 
current woes. 
A number of  discordant facts are important for an understanding of  what 
happened. First, the productivity-growth decline in many other countries was 
larger, absolutely, than in the United States, and there it was not associated 350  Chapter 14 
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Notes: Measurable  sectors are agriculture,  mining, manufacturing, transportation, communica- 
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and government. Values for 1977-1987 are based on 1987 weights; values for 1948-1976 are based 
on 1982 weights (the series are linked at 1977). 
Gross domestic product per man-hour (thousands of 1982 dollars, 
with declines in R&D investment.2 Second, as illustrated in Figure 14.1, the 
sectors where the productivity  slowdown has persisted in the United States 
are largely outside of manufacturing,  communications, and agriculture (see 
Gordon, 1987). Besides mining and public utilities, which were affected more 
specifically by the energy-price shocks, it has lingered particularly in construc- 
tion, finance, and other services where output measurement is notoriously dif- 
ficult. Third, the decline in patent grants in the 1970s was just a bureaucratic 
mirage, an example of fluctuations induced by changes in the data-generating 
process (a budgetary crisis in the Patent Office) rather than a reflection of the 
underlying activity it~elf.~  The number of patent applications did not decline 
significantly during this period, but also it did not grow. The latter fact, coupled 
with a continuous upward growth in the absolute level of company-financed 
R&D, resulted in a persistent decline in the patents per R&D ratio in the United 
States (and also in most of the other countries for which we have data). This 
raised the specter of  diminishing returns to R&D and offered the hypothe- 
2. For example, the rate of growth in total factor productivity declined between the 1960s and 
the 1970s  by 4.5 percent in Japan, 3.3 percent in France, and “only” 2 percent in the United States 
(see Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1993). 
3. See Griliches (1990) for more details on this story. 351  Productivity, R&D, and the Data Constraint 
sis of “exhaustion of inventive opportunities” as a potential explanation for the 
productivity slowdown. 
This hypothesis has been examined recently by  various authors. There are 
basically two styles of  analysis: one focuses directly on the link, if  any, be- 
tween R&D and productivity growth (see e.g., Griliches, 1986a; Bronwyn 
Hall,  1993; Scherer, 1993), while the other uses patents as indicators of  the 
output of the R&D effort and looks at what has happened to the “knowledge- 
production function” (see e.g., Griliches, 1990; Ricardo Caballero and Adam 
Jaffe, 1993; Robert Evenson, 1993; Samuel Kortum, 1993). The bridge that is 
missing between these two approaches would examine the units in which pa- 
tents affect productivity growth and ask whether they have stayed constant over 
time. Without such constancy, no clear interpretation is possible. 
14.2  Productivity Growth and the Role of R&D 
In parallel to the aggregate “residual” literature, a more micro-oriented ap- 
proach had developed. It took the study of technical change, diffusion, and the 
role of formal R&D as its main challenge, with the hope of bringing more of 
it within the realm of economic analysis, helping thereby also to explain some 
of this residual away. Using modem language, one can interpret Edwin Mans- 
field‘s and my own early work on diffusion and on the role of R&D in agricul- 
ture and manufacturing as trying to endogenize as much of technical change 
as was possible (Griliches, 1957, 1958, 1964; Mansfield, 1961, 1965). Other 
important contributors to this literature were Richard Nelson, Scherer, Jacob 
Schmookler, and Nestor Terleckyj. By  expanding the notion of capital to in- 
clude also R&D capital and estimating its effects, this literature documented 
the contribution of public and private investments in R&D and their spillovers 
to the growth of prod~ctivity.~  But the magnitude of the estimated effects was 
modest, not enough to account for the bulk of  the observed residual or the 
fluctuations in it (Griliches, 1988). The experience here was similar to other 
attempts to account for the residual, such as using “embodiment” theories to 
magnify the potential effects of capital accumulation (Denison, 1962; Nelson, 
1962) or looking for increasing returns to scale (Griliches and Vidar Ringstad, 
1971). These various effects are real and nonnegligible, but not large enough. 
There is one other way of trying to make something more out of the R&D 
story: the possibility that the productivity impact of R&D has declined over 
time-that  the coefficients have changed. This hypothesis has been investi- 
gated repeatedly by  a number of researchers with mixed results. Studies that 
used data through the 1970s and early 1980s found no decline in the relevant 
coefficients. More recent studies that analyze data through the late 1980s re- 
port more mixed results, varying strongly with how the computer industry and 
4. This literature has been surveyed in Griliches (1979, 1991), Jacques Mairesse and Mohamed 
Sassenou (1991), Wallace Huffrnan and Evenson (1993), and M. I. Nadiri (1993). 352  Chapter 14 
Table 14.1  Industry TFP Growth Regressions: Coefficients of the R&D-Sales 
Ratio by Period, Three-Digit SIC Level (N  = 143 or 142) 
Row  Period  With computers  Without computers 
1  1958-1973  0.332 (0.066)  0.317 (0.066) 
2  1973-1989  0.357 (0.072)  0.134 (0.059) 
3a  1978-1989  0.300 (0.073)  0.115 (0.062) 
3b  1978-1989  “revised”  0.461 (0.070)  0.348 (0.070) 
Norest The equations include also dlog(energykapita1) as an additional utilization variable. Stan- 
dard errors are shown in parentheses. The ratio of company-financed R&D to total sales in 1974 
is from Scherer (1984) for row 1; this ratio is updated for 1984 from National Science Foundation 
(1992) for rows 2 and 3. Row 3b shows total-factor-productivity growth revised downward for 
computers and upward for electronic components and drugs (computers = SIC 357). 
its deflator are handled in the analy~is.~  At the same time, the stock market’s 
valuation of R&D fell significantly, in terms of both ex post returns to R&D 
in the 1980s (Michael Jensen, 1993) and the market’s  view of  current R&D 
investments (Bronwyn Hall and Robert Hall, 1993; B. Hall, 1993). 
My own recent foray into this type of analysis of industry data at the three- 
digit SIC level is summarized in Table 14.1.6  It reports estimates from regres- 
sions of growth rates in total factor productivity (TFP) on the rate of investment 
in R&D (the R&D-sales ratio), where the estimated coefficient can be inter- 
preted as the excess gross rate of return to R&D (Griliches, 1979). The earlier 
1958-1973  period yields an estimate on the order of 0.33, while the estimate 
for the later 1973-1989  period even rises a bit, to 0.36. So far, so good! But 
when one excludes the outlier computer industry (see Fig. 14.2) the estimated 
coefficient falls from 0.36 to 0.13 for 1973-1989  and even lower for 1978- 
1989. Only one observation out of  143 does this!’ 
These results raise a major data conundrum: is it right to treat the computer 
industry as an outlier and exclude it from such calculations just because the 
5.  As reported in Griliches (1986a), I found no significant decline in the relevant coefficients 
through the mid-1970s. Frank Lichtenberg and Donald Siege1 (1991) replicated and extended this 
work to the  early  1980s and found increases in the relevant coefficients through  1985. B. Hall 
(1993) updated and extended the Griliches and Mairesse (1984) study of publicly traded U.S. 
manufacturing firms to the end of the 1980s and found that the R&D coefficients came close to 
disappearing in the 1970s and early 1980s but recovered in the late 1980s to about half or more of 
their original size. Her result is very  sensitive, however, to the particular deflators used in con- 
structing the output measure. When separate industry-level deflators are used, including the newly 
revised deflator for the output of the computer industry, there is no evidence of a decline in the 
“potency” of R&D at all; the estimated coefficients rise rather than fall. See also Englander et al. 
(1988), Pan Patel and Luc Soete (1988), Sveikauskas (1990). and Scherer (1993). 
6.  The total-factor-productivity numbers come from the National Bureau of Economic Research 
data base (Wayne Gray, 1992). The R&D numbers come from Scherer (1984), updated to 1984 
using 2.5-digit-level information from National Science Foundation (1992). 
7. Updating the Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984) results for 28 2.5-digit SIC industries and 
using a possibly more appropriate R&D-by-product-field measure yields essentially similar re- 
sults, as does a parallel computation at the more aggregated two-digit SIC level using unpublished 
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Fig. 14.2  Total-factor-productivity  growth (per annum) and research intensity 
in U.S. manufacturing, three-digit SIC level, 1978-1989 
productivity measure may be better there? It is quite possible that if other tech- 
nologically advanced industries (such as instruments, communications equip- 
ment, and pharmaceuticals) had their price indexes adjusted in a similar fash- 
ion, Figure 14.2 would look much better, with the computer industry not being 
as much of an outlier and with the whole period showing much higher (social) 
returns to R&D. That this is indeed the case can be seen in Figure 14.3, where 
only three such adjustments are made, but before I discuss it, I need to digress 
briefly  and  remind  you  about  the  developments in  computer  price  mea- 
surement. 
Quality change is the bane of  price and output measurement. Until  1986, 
computer prices were treated as unchanged in the national income accounts. It 
took 25 years for the recommendations of  the Stigler committee (Griliches, 
1961; National Bureau of Economic Research, 1961) to have a noticeable ef- 
fect on official practice, but when they did, they did it with a bang! In 1986 
the Bureau of  Economic Analysis (BEA) introduced a new  computer price 
index, based on hedonic regression methods, into the national accounts and 
revised them back to 1972 (Rosanne Cole et al., 1986).8  This index was falling 
by  about 15 percent per year or more (as compared to the assumed value of 
zero before), and that had several major implications, including the fact that it 
made the apparent recovery in manufacturing productivity in the 1980s much 
stronger, about one-third of the total coming from the introduction of this price 
index alone (Gordon, 1993b). 
There was nothing wrong with the price index itself. It was, indeed, a major 
8. For historical background on these developments see Jack Triplett (1989) and Ernst Berndt 
(1991 Ch. 4). 354  Chapter 14 
advance, and the BEA should be congratulated for making it, but the way  it 
was introduced created some problems. First, it was a unique adjustment. No 
other high-tech product had received parallel treatment, and thus it stuck out 
like a sore thumb. This had the unfortunate consequence that the productivity 
growth in the computer industry itself was seriously overestimated, because 
some of its major inputs, such as semiconductors, were not similarly deflated. 
Second, it was  introduced into a framework with  fixed weights, wreaking 
havoc on it. Using fixed 1982 weights and a sharply falling price index implied 
the absence of a “real” computer industry in the early 1970s and a very rapid 
growth in its importance, leading to a more than doubling of the share of ma- 
chinery in total manufacturing output by the late 1980s. This last problem has 
largely been solved recently with the introduction of “benchmark-weighted” 
estimates of gross domestic product (GDP) and the moving away from fixed- 
weights national income accounting (Allan Young, 1992). But the first prob- 
lem, the uniqueness of this adjustment in the face of  similar, though perhaps 
not as extreme, problems elsewhere remains to haunt us. 
What I have done in Figure 14.3 (and in row 3b of Table 14.1) is to adjust 
the estimated TFP growth in the computer industry downward by  deflating 
materials purchases in this industry, which to a significant extent consist of 
purchases of  other computer components and semiconductors, by  the same 
output price index. I have also substituted a similar price index in the semicon- 
ductors (electronic components) industry and also adjusted the growth of TFP 
in the pharmaceuticals industry upward to reflect the exclusion of price de- 
clines due to the introduction of generics in the current measurement proce- 
dures. (I shall come back to discuss this last adjustment later on.) So adjusted, 
0.000  0.025  0.050  0.075  0.100  0 
R&D-Sales  Ratio in  1984 
25 
Fig. 14.3  Revised total-factor-productivity  growth (per annum), U.S. three- 
digit manufacturing industries, 1978-1989 
Note: Computers adjusted downward; electronic components and drugs adjusted upward. 355  Productivity, R&D, and the Data Constraint 
Figure 14.3 does not look all that bad, and row 3b in Table 14.1 indicates no 
decline in the R&D coefficient even without the computer industry. 
What is one to make of these conflicting stories? It seems that the observed 
decline in the R&D coefficients did not begin seriously until the latter half of 
the 1970s, with the second oil-price shock and the rise in the dollar exchange 
rate. The abruptness of the decline argues against a “supply-side” explanation 
in terms of  exhaustion of  inventive opportunities. It is more likely that the 
peculiar aggregate shocks of that time went against R&D-intensive industries: 
first, because they hit energy-intensive industries such as chemicals and petro- 
leum refining more severely; and second, because the subsequent rise in value 
of the dollar and the expansion in imports that followed hit some of the more 
high-tech R&D-intensive industries even harder, leading to declines in “com- 
petitiveness,” losses of rents, and the appearance of excess capacity. The subse- 
quent rise in the R&D coefficients (if it did in fact occur), the rise in corporate 
R&D investments through most of the 1980s, and the rise in patenting in the 
late 1980s (as we  shall see), all argue against interpreting these coefficient 
movements as reflecting “real” declines in the once and future “potency” of 
R&D. What did happen, though, was a sharp widening of the differential be- 
tween social and private returns to R&D. The internationalization of R&D, the 
rise in the technical and entrepreneurial skills of our competitors, and the sharp 
rise in the dollar exchange rate in the mid-l980s, all combined to erode, rather 
rapidly, the rents accruing to the earlier accumulated R&D capital and to the 
technical-expertise positions of many of our enterprises. This rise in the rate 
of  private obsolescence and the fall in the “appropriability” of  R&D led to 
sharp declines in both profitability and real product prices. The latter, if  they 
were actually reflected in the appropriate price indexes, would show up as an 
increase in productivity, rather than a decline. 
Before accepting this inconclusive verdict, one still has to face the evidence 
of declining patent-to-R&D ratios. Figure 14.4 plots domestic patent applica- 
tions divided by  total company-financed R&D expenditures in U.S. industry 
(in 1972 dollars) and by the total number of scientists and engineers in indus- 
try. Looking at the right half of this plot (the last couple of decades) we see a 
more or less continuous decline with a small, but possibly significant, turn- 
around in the late 1980s. Similar trends can be seen also in other countries, 
even in Japan (Evenson, 1991). But before one takes this as an indicator of our 
recent problems, one should glance also at the left side of this figure, which 
goes back to the early 1920s. How  long has this been going on? This ratio 
keeps falling, both through good times (while productivity growth rates were 
rising) and bad times. If this was not a cause for worry earlier, why should one 
worry about it 
9. Actually quite a few people worried about it then also: see Griliches (1990)  for more detail 
and W.  Fellner (1970),  who worried about the rising real cost of R&D as an indicator of diminish- 
ing returns. 356  Chapter 14 
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Fig. 14.4  Domestic patent applications per company-financed R&D in industry 
(dashed line; in 1972 dollars) and per scientist and engineer (solid line), log scale 
14.3  Patents: A Shrinking Yardstick? 
To  decide whether we  should be worried by  what is happening with the 
patent numbers we need to know what they measure. Since I have discussed 
this at some length elsewhere (Griliches, 19901, I will make only two points 
here. First, the interpretation of Figure 14.4 need not be pessimistic. Its mes- 
sage may not be what meets the eye. And, second, the meaning of  both the 
numerator and the denominators of the ratios plotted in Figure 14.4 may have 
changed significantly over time. 
If  patents can be taken as indicators of  invention, and if  the value of  an 
invention is proportional to the size of its market (or economy), then the fact 
that their total numbers remained roughly constant over long time periods is 
consistent with nondeclining growth rates of output and overall productivity.’O 
If inventions are “produced” by a combination of current R&D and the existing 
state of knowledge (incorporating the accumulated effects of science and spill- 
overs from the previous research activities of others), and if R&D is invested 
approximately “optimally,” then under reasonable assumptions, a rise (or fall) 
in the underlying knowledge stock will affect them both in parallel fashion and 
will leave their ratio unchanged.” There will be, therefore, no evidence in this 
10. This follows  from  the  nonrival  nature  of  inventions  (see  Kenneth Arrow,  1962; Paul 
Romer, 1990). 
11. Assume an aggregate inventions “production function” of the form N = WZ, where R is a 
measure of current R&D inputs and Z represents all other shifters of this function: the accumula- 
tion of one’s own past R&D successes and also spillovers from the research efforts of others. Then, 
y < 1 implies short-run diminishing returns to current R&D, a “fishing-out’’ phenomenon given 
the current “state of  the art” Z. To  the extent that endogenous (and exogenous) forces “recharge” 357  Productivity, R&D, and the Data Constraint 
ratio on the underlying state of the “stock of knowledge.” Moreover, it will be 
declining with growth in the size of  the market, since a rise in the value of 
inventions will push R&D up until present costs equal again the present value 
of future (private) returns. 
The rate of growth of domestic patents was close to zero during the last three 
decades. That by  itself should not be worrisome. If  their average value had 
been growing at the same rate as the economy as a whole, there would be no 
reason for us to worry about it. But there were long periods when the actual 
numbers were  worse than that. During  1965-1985  the number of  domestic 
patent applications declined by -  0.6 percent per year while company-financed 
R&D expenditures were growing by 4.8  percent per year, in constant prices. 
But a negative growth rate in the number of inventions and a positive one in 
R&D are inconsistent with an unchanging inventions production function, un- 
less the overall pool of available knowledge is declining, or more likely, unless 
the relationship between inventions and the number of patents applied for has 
been changing. 
The suspicion that the relationship between the number of patents and the 
number of  inventions (weighted by  their relative economic importance) has 
been changing is not new. Schmookler (1966) stops most of his analysis with 
pre-World  War  I1  data, believing that the  meaning of  the patent statistics 
changed at that time. What needs to be reconciled in the data is the sharp 
contrast between the rapidly growing R&D series during 1953-1968  (and ear- 
lier) and the essentially flat patent series. There are a number of not mutually 




The fast-growing R&D expenditures, fueled by the new global opportuni- 
ties that opened up in the post-World  War I1 period, were being invested 
in the face of rapidly diminishing returns. 
Some of  the observed growth in R&D could be spurious, the result of 
reclassification of informal technological activities into formal R&D un- 
der the pressure of  tax accountants, public-relations experts, and R&D 
tax credits. 
The rise of formal R&D-based invention crowded out smaller, less valu- 
able individual-inventor-based  patents, while the rise in the cost of patent- 
ing (in terms of the time costs of dealing with the patent system) and the 
more recent sharp rise in fees may have  selected out a large number of 
the pool (in Evenson’s [  19911 terminology) and change Z as the result of the direct and indirect 
additions to the overall stock of knowledge, there need not be diminishing returns to R in the long 
run. If R is chosen so as to equate the value of its marginal product, V(yNIR),  to the marginal real 
cost of R, C,  and if Vis the expected present value of an invention, one can rewrite the first-order 
condition as NIR = C/yY which yields the major conclusion that the ratio of inventions per unit 
of R&D is independent of the state of general knowledge Z.  Moreover, NIR will be declining in 
the size of the market. For a more detailed elaboration of such models see the “quality-ladders” 
approach of Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1991), Caballero and Jaffe (1993), and Kor- 
tum (1993). 358  Chapter 14 
potentially low-valued patents. Given the evidence that the value distribu- 
tion of inventions and patents is extremely skewed, with only a small frac- 
tion having a high present value, such a crowding out could raise average 
values significantly, though the required rate is rather on the high side.  l2 
It is also likely that the threshold for what is patentable has risen, given the 
large influx of foreign patent applications into the U.S. system all impinging 
on a relatively slow-growing and budget-constrained patent 0ffi~e.l~  On the 
other hand, the legal status of patents in the United States has improved sig- 
nificantly with the creation of a special patents court, driving up the expected 
private value of a patent. Given the presence of so many opposing forces, there 
is no compelling need to rely on the exhaustion-of-inventive-opportunities  hy- 
pothesis, especially since patents-to-R&D ratios were falling much more dras- 
tically during the “good times” of the past than recent1y.l4  Moreover, if we do 
take these numbers seriously, then good news is just around the comer: domes- 
tic patent applications have risen sharply in the last five years (see Fig. 14.5), 
implying a potential resurgence in the rate of technological change. This leaves 
us, however, more or less where we  started, with the productivity slowdown 
largely unexplained. 
14.4  Why Is the Glass Half-Empty? 
Economists have not been very successful in explaining what has happened 
to the economy during the last two decades, nor have they been able to agree 
on what should be done about it. I will argue that data and measurement diffi- 
culties may in fact be a major source of this failure. This point will be made 
not to provide us with an alibi, but rather to temper the pretentiousness of 
some of our pronouncements and to urge us toward the more mundane tasks 
of observation and measurement. 
12. There is scattered evidence on the rising “quality” of patents from patent renewal data (see 
Mark Schankerman and Arid Pakes, 1986; Pakes and Margaret Simpson,  1989) and from the 
rising number of claims per patent (see X. Tong and J. D. Frame, 1992). The latter, for example, 
rose at about 2.5 percent per year between 1970 and 1990. That is about right for this period but 
far too low for the 6+ percent earlier. On the other hand, Caballero and Jaffe (1993), using citation 
data, find that the average “size” of a patent did not grow during the last 20 years. 
13. There is some evidence that such crowding-out may have occurred. Between 1966-1969 
and 1981-1985  the “yield ratio” for domestic patent applications in terms of grants received fell 
by about 15 percent (from 0.68 to 0.58) before recovering somewhat in the late 1980s (to 0.62). 
See Griliches (1990) for a survey of these issues and citations of the relevant literature. 
14. A similar story is also told by other scattered invention “output” indicators. In their study of 
innovations in the chemical, textile, and machinery-tools industries, Baily and Chakrabarti (1988) 
found a decline in the number of innovations in the 1970s in two out of these three industries, and 
some recovery thereafter. Similar patterns were observed in a study of British industrial innova- 
tions (see the figure in Gerhard Mensch et al. [1991]). In both cases the timing is not right for an 
explanation of the slowdown in the  1970s. The impact on productivity is too fast. Rather, it is 
likely to reflect the impact of the slowdown in the growth of aggregate demand and the recessions 
of the 1970s. In both cases there is an upturn in the 1980s. 359  Productivity, R&D, and the Data Constraint 
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Fig. 14.5  Patent applications in the United States, 188G1992 
Why don’t we know more after all these years? Our data have always been 
less than perfect. What is it about the recent situation that has made matters 
worse? 
The brief  answer is  that  the  economy has  changed and  that  our data- 
collection efforts have not kept pace with it. “Real” national income accounts 
were designed in an earlier era, when the economy was simpler and had a large 
agricultural sector and a growing manufacturing sector. Even then, a number 
of compromises had to be made to get measurement off the ground. In large 
sectors of the economy, such as construction and most of the services, govern- 
ment, and other public institutions, there were no real output measures or rele- 
vant price deflators. Imagine a “degrees of  measurability” scale, with wheat 
production at one end and lawyer services at the other. One can draw a rough 
dividing line on this scale between what I shall call “reasonably measurable” 
sectors and the rest, where the situation is not much better today than it was at 
the beginning of the national income accounts. Table  14.2 shows the distribu- 
tion of nominal GDP by major industrial sector. In the early post-World  War 
I1 period, the situation was not all that bad: about half of the overall economy 
was “measurable” in this sense. By 1990, however, the fraction of the economy 
for which the productivity numbers are half reasonable had fallen to below 
one-third. Figure 14.6 tells the same story with employment numbers. Mea- 
surement problems have indeed become worse. Our ability to interpret changes 
in aggregate total factor productivity has declined, and major portions of actual 
technical change have eluded our measurement framework entirely.  Is 
15. An  argument could be made that this story would not be so bleak if  we had focused on 
consumption expenditures instead, since many of  the offending industries produce largely inter- 
mediate products and services. But personal consumption expenditures account only for about 68 360  Chapter 14 
Table 14.2  The Distribution of GNP by Major Industrial Sector, in Current 
Prices (Percentages) 





Transportation and utilities 
Wholesale trade 
Retail trade 




8.8  4.1  3.0  2.8  2.0 
2.9  2.5  1.8  2.7  1.8 
3.9  4.8  5.1  4.8  4.4 
28.1  28.6  26.9  23.6  18.4 
8.9  9.1  8.6  9.1  8.7 
7.1  6.9  6.7  7.0  6.5 
11.7  9.9  9.8  9.6  9.3 
10.1  13.8  14.2  14.4  17.7 
8.6  9.7  11.5  13.0  18.9 
8.6  10.2  12.6  12.5  12.2 
48.7  44.3  40.3  38.2  30.9 
Source: Tables 6.1 and 6.2 of the National Income and Products Accounts (1928-1982)  and Survey 
of  Current Business (May 1993). 
Note: Numbers before 1977 are not strictly comparable, since the latest revision was carried back 
only to 1977. 
”Agriculture,  mining, manufacturing, and transportation and utilities. 
An example of the consequences of this shift is what has come to be known 
as the “computer paradox.” We  have  made major investments in computers 
and in other information-processing equipment. The share of  “information” 
equipment in total producer investment in durable equipment, in current prices, 
has more than doubled, from about 17 percent in 1960 to 36 percent in 1992. 
Computers alone went up from less than 1 percent to 11 percent of the total; 
and that does not allow for improvements in the quality of  this equipment, 
which has been happening at a very fast rate-on  the order of  15-30  percent 
per year (see Jack Triplett, 1989; Bemdt and Griliches, 1993). Why has this 
not translated itself into visible productivity gains? The major answer to this 
puzzle is very simple: over three-quarters of this investment has gone into our 
“unmeasurable” sectors (see Table  14.3), and thus its productivity effects, 
which are likely to be quite real, are largely invisible in the data. 
That there were gains is not really in doubt. Just observing the changes in 
the way  banks and airlines operate, and in the ways in which information is 
delivered to firms and consumers, would lead one to conclude that we are in 
the midst of  a major technical revolution. Effective distances are declining 
rapidly in many parts of the world. The rise of ATM networks in banking has 
resulted in substantial though largely unmeasured time savings for consumers. 
percent of GDP, while services represent 56 percent of personal consumption. Thus, it is unlikely 
that looking at consumption data in more detail would change the tenor of  my remarks much. A 
cursory look at Personal Consumption Expenditures (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1990) yields 
a rough estimate of  47 percent of  total consumption expenditures not easily measurable in real 
terms. The two largest difficult items consist of hard-to-measure services  in the medical, insurance, 
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Table 14.3  Investment in Computers (OCAM) in the US.  Economy (Percentage 
of Total) 









































“Unmeasurable” sectorsa  64.1  72.3  71.9 
Plus consumer and government purchases as 
percentage of all computer (OCAM) purchases  67.7  77.6  77.0 
Source: Unpublished BEA tabulations. 
Notes: OCAM = office, computing, and accounting machinery. 
“Construction, trade, F.I.R.E., and other services. 
It is less clear, however, whether the large expansion of the securities industry 
has been associated with a similar productivity increase or was  primarily a 
response to a real decline in the cost of  rent-seeking induced by  the falling 
price of information processing (see Timothy Bresnahan et al., 1992). 
There is also some scattered evidence for the positive contribution of com- 
puters in manufacturing, but given the needle-in-the haystack aspect of  this 
problem, it is not particularly strong (see e.g., Alan Krueger, 1993; Donald 362  Chapter 14 
Siege1 and Griliches, 1992; Erik Brynjolfsson and Lorin Hitt, 1993; Igal Hen- 
del, 1993). Some of the gains from computers have been reflected in higher 
wages of their operators and in the more general rise in the returns to education 
and “skill” (Chinhui Juhn et al., 1993). More generally, we may be just at the 
beginning of the computer era, early in its diffusion and learning stages, with 
most of  the productivity contributions still to come, as we learn how to use 
computers more effectively and integrate them more efficiently into the ex- 
isting production structures (Paul David, 1991). 
Similar arguments, can be (and have been) made about the difficulties in 
measuring the contribution of  R&D to productivity growth (see Griliches, 
1979). From one-third to over half of all industrial R&D is “sold” to the gov- 
ernment, either in the form of research contracts and prototypes or indirectly 
in the form of weapons and space equipment, and its direct productivity effects 
do not show up in the data at all. Private R&D investment is also likely to have 
followed the economy and shifted its targets toward the faster-growing sectors, 
with more invention and technical change occurring exactly where we have 
more trouble in measuring them. 
Not only has the economy shifted into uncharted waters, but even in the 
“measurable” sectors accelerating rates of change have destroyed the basis for 
some of the older compromises. Currently, new goods are introduced into the 
various official price indexes rather slowly. While attempts are being made to 
reduce the revision cycle in the producer price index from five to two years for 
some of  the more high-tech goods, this may  still not be fast enough. In the 
personal-computers market, for example, the life of a model has recently fallen 
to a year or less (Berndt et al., 1995). 
Dealing with the quality-change problem by  treating every version of  a 
product sold to a different type of  customer as a separate commodity, as is 
currently the predominant official practice, creates its own problems. By link- 
ing out the decline in prices experienced by consumers in their shift to super- 
markets, discount stores, and mail-order purchases, it underestimates signifi- 
cantly not only the output of services, but also the output of some of the more 
“standard” manufacturing industries (Marshall Reinsdorf, 1993). A prime ex- 
ample of that is the treatment of generics in the pharmaceutical price indexes. 
The stylized facts are as follows: 
(i)  Generics are introduced at roughly half the price of the original brand. 
(ii) The brand price, however, does not decline (it sometimes even goes up), 
with the ex-monopolist depreciating optimally her original position and 
with generics gaining between half and three-quarters of the market for 
the particular drug. 
(iii) But because generic versions are treated as separate commodities, in spite 
of what the FDA says, the price index does not fall, and since the value 
of shipments declines as the market shifts to generics (and to hospital and 363  Productivity, R&D, and the Data Constraint 
HMO formularies), so does measured “output” in this industry and the 
associated productivity measures (Griliches and Iain Cockburn, 1994). 
This might explain the rather strange fact that during the last decade phar- 
maceuticals, an industry with one of the highest R&D-sales ratios, had a rather 
dismal productivity-growth performance. This was the period with an increas- 
ing penetration of generics, which should have reduced measured prices in this 
industry but did not. 
The measurement environment has deteriorated also in other ways. There is 
less willingness on the part of firms and consumers to respond to detailed ques- 
tions, and our government has done little to emphasize the importance of good 
economic data to its own functioning or to the overall understanding of  our 
economy. The consequence of such deterioration can be illustrated by the un- 
certainty about the level of industrial investment in basic research, an invest- 
ment which many think is crucial to our long-run economic performance (Gril- 
iches, 1986a). Because the question that asks about the allocation of total R&D 
expenditures by  the “character of work” is not mandatory and is also not an 
easy one to answer, less than half of all the firms surveyed in 1988 answered 
it. As a result of  such nonresponse, the best that can be done is to produce a 
“reasonable” range of estimates, based on alternative imputation algorithms, 
from $2.5 to $8.2 billion (and a “central” guess of $3.9 billion), which leaves 
us  really in the dark as to what has happened to such investments recently 
(Eileen I. Collins, 1990). 
14.5  Data Woes 
Why are the data not better? The facts themselves are not in dispute. Every 
decade or so a prestigious commission or committee produces a report describ- 
ing in detail various data difficulties and lacunae: the Stigler committee report 
on government price statistics (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1961) 
is still a living document, as are the related Ruggles report (Richard Ruggles, 
1977), the Rees productivity report (National Academy of Sciences, 1979), the 
Bonnen report (J. T.  Bonnen, 1981), the Creamer GNP improvement report 
(D. Creamer, 1977), the recent OTA report (Office of Technology Assessment, 
1989), and many others. But life goes on, and change in this area is very slow. 
Why? I don’t really have good answers to this question, and the topic itself is 
much larger than can be handled in this address, but at least three observations 
come to mind: 
(i) The measurement problems are really hard. 
(ii) Economists have  little clout in Washington, especially as far as  data- 
collection activities are concerned. Moreover, the governmental agencies 
in these areas are balkanized and underfunded. 364  Chapter 14 
(iii) We  ourselves do not put enough emphasis on the value of data and data 
collection in our training of graduate students and in the reward structure 
of our profession. It is the preparation skill of the econometric chef that 
catches the professional eye, not the quality of the raw materials in the 
meal, or the effort that went into procuring them (Griliches, 1986b). 
In many  cases the desired data are unavailable because their measurement 
is really difficult.  After decades of discussion we are not even close to a profes- 
sional agreement on how to define and measure the output of banking, insur- 
ance, or the stock market (see Griliches, 1992). Similar difficulties arise in 
conceptualizing the output of health services, lawyers, and other consultants, 
or the capital stock of R&D. While the tasks are difficult, progress has been 
made on such topics. The work of Jorgenson and Barbara Fraumeni (1992) on 
the measurement of educational output is an example both of what can be done 
and of the difficulties that still remain. But it is not reasonable for us to expect 
the government to produce statistics in areas where the concepts are mushy 
and where there is little professional agreement on what is to be measured and 
how.  Much  more  could be  done, however, in  an exploratory and research 
mode.I6 Unfortunately, the various statistical agencies have been both starved 
for funds and badly led, with the existing bureaucratic structure downplaying 
the research components of their enterprise when not being outright hostile to 
them, research being cut first when a budget crunch happens (Triplett, 1991). 
Our current statistical structure is badly split, there is no central direction, 
and the funding is heavily politicized. How else can one explain that the na- 
tional income accounts and the BEA as a whole receive only one-third, and 
health and education statistics each less than one-half of the funds allocated to 
agricultural statistics?” How does one explain the failure of  the most recent 
attempt at getting more money for economic statistics, the late “Boskin initia- 
tive”? Central economic statistics do not have a clear constituency that lobbies 
on their behalf. Recent governments seem not to care enough, or to have 
enough energy to fight for something that has a more distant horizon than the 
next election. One hopes for some improvement in this situation from the cur- 
rent administration. It has people who know better in reasonably important 
positions. Still, with the main focus on the daily crisis and the continuing bud- 
16. I refrain from offering a detailed list of my own favorite data improvements; but a census 
of real wealth (i.e., a survey of structure, equipment, and other resources and their utilization- 
not just what is on the books, but what is actually out there in the field) would be high on my 
list. I would also like to see a survey of patent owners on the use and potential value of their 
property rights. 
17. I am  not arguing that too much is currently being spent on agricultural statistics. That would 
require a substantive analysis, which has not been done. I am saying, however, that the other areas 
of federal statistics could use both more funding and a redirection of existing funding. We are also 
currently spending far more on monthly employment and average hourly earnings data than we 
spend to collect all of the other inputs and outputs annually. With Congressional prodding, we 
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get battles with Congress, I am not all that optimistic. But if we want progress 
in this area, if we care, we need to make our opinions heard. We  need to con- 
vince Congress (and ourselves) that the requests for additional funding of the 
statistical infrastructure are justified as investments in general knowledge and 
more informed policy formation; that they are not just self-serving, intended 
to allow us to publish more articles or run thousands more regressions; that it 
is indeed important to know what is happening and to understand where we 
might be going or drifting.I8 
We need also to make observation, data collection, and data analysis a more 
central component of our graduate teaching. How can we expect our commu- 
nity to fight for the budgets of the BEA, BLS, or Census, if the average student 
doesn’t really know how the data that they use are manufactured or what the 
national accounts are made  We  also need to teach them to go out and 
collect their own data on interesting aspects of the economy and to rely less 
on “given” data from distant agencies.*O There are encouraging signs that some 
of this is happening, especially in the micro area. One is much more cheered 
by work such as that of Robert Fogel (1986) on heights and nutrition, Alan 
Krueger and Orley Ashenfelter (1994) on twins, Richard Levin et al. (1987) 
on the appropriability of  technology, Rebecca Henderson and Cockburn on 
pharmaceutical R&D, Richard Freeman and Harry Holzer (1986) on inner- 
city youths, Schankerman and Pakes (1986) on patent renewal data, Manuel 
Trajtenberg (1990a) on CT scanners, and Trajtenberg (1990b) and Adam Jaffe 
et al. (1993) on patent citations, where researchers go out, collect, and create 
new data sets, than by  the 20,000th regression on the Robert Summers and 
Alan Heston (1991) data set, illuminating as it may be. But unless we transmit 
this message to our students, we will not be able to convince others that this is 
a cause worth supporting. 
14.6  Expanding the Framework 
Is there something possibly wrong with the way  we ask the productivity 
question, with the analytical framework into which we force the available data? 
I think so. I would focus on the treatment of disequilibria and the measurement 
of  knowledge and other externalities. The current measurement framework 
18. One should probably worry also about the overall level of support for economic research. 
As a percentage of total academic research funding, it fell from 1.5 percent in 1979 to 1.2 percent 
in 1990. While the number of economists doing academic research was rising at 5.5 percent per 
year, funds per researcher were falling in real terms at -2.3  percent per year, and the Federal share 
in these funds was also dropping from 48 percent to only 27 percent (in 1989). At the same time, 
real funds per researcher in the academy as a whole were rising at 0.4 percent per year (National 
Science Board, 1991). What is it that we have been doing wrong? 
19. The recent shift toward a “three essays” W.D. thesis is also not conducive to a serious 
involvement with data creation. 
20. Unfortunately, the usage is apt. Data already means ‘‘given’’ rather than collected or ob- 
served. 366  Chapter 14 
proceeds as if  all investment and employment decisions are made at known 
and common factor and product prices, throwing all of the heterogeneity and 
uncertainty-the  surprises and the disappointments-into  the residual cate- 
gory. An alternative view would see measured productivity growth as a sum- 
mation of  above- (and below-) average returns to various current investment 
decisions and capital gains (or losses) on existing physical- and human-capital 
stocks.**  The appearance of  such investment opportunities is the essence of 
growth and change. They are largely disequilibrium phenomena, resulting in a 
lurching from one “steady state” to another rather than something smooth and 
exponential. The presence of locally increasing returns, network externalities, 
asymmetric information, and heterogeneous expectations, the appearance of 
new products and technologies, and the changes in the political and regulatory 
environments are all sources of such “excess” returns, while the ex post fixity 
of  much of  the investment in both physical and human capital causes capital 
gains and losses and unanticipated “obsolescence” in the various stocks. We 
will have to figure out how to take the residual apart along such lines to make 
more progress in understanding its proximate sources. 
Our theories tend to assume that we are, indeed, at the frontier and that we 
can only either move  along it or try  to shift it, the latter being  a difficult 
and chancy business. In fact we  may  be far from our existing “frontiers.” 
Harvey Leibenstein’s (1966) ideas about X-efficiency, or more correctly X- 
inefficiency, did not get much of a sympathetic ear from us. They were incon- 
sistent with notions of equilibrium, the absence of unexploited profit opportu- 
nities, and the possibilities for economic arbitrage. But real economic growth 
is the consequence of both the appearance of such disequilibria and the devis- 
ing of ways of closing them. How quickly they are eliminated depends on the 
strength of incentive systems within enterprises, and on their organizational 
quality. In spite of the large growth in the literature on organizations, we have 
not yet developed useful ways of  quantifying their strengths and weaknesses. 
Nor are we close to having measures of  such factors as the “work ethic” or 
aspects of the property-rights system which are likely to contribute much to 
the observed differences in productivity across nations. 
The “new” growth theories have  various externalities as their centerpiece 
(see Solow [1991] for a recent review). It is somewhat ironic that they have 
come to the fore just when growth started declining and notions of  eternal 
exponential growth began to lose their luster. Knowledge externalities are ob- 
viously very important in the growth process, but they do not help us to explain 
what has happened in the last two decades. There is no reason to believe that 
they have declined over time. If anything, the communication and transporta- 
tion advances should have expanded the availability of such externalities.**  But 
we have no good models for the measurement of such processes. 
21. This is not a new idea. Versions of it appear in Harry Johnson (1964), Arnold Harberger 
22. The story is similar for externalities from human-capital investments, another linchpin of 
(1990), and Theodore Schultz (1990) and presumably also elsewhere. 
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Knowledge is not like a stock of ore, sitting there waiting to be mined. It is 
an extremely heterogeneous assortment  of  information in  continuous flux. 
Only a small part of it is of any use to someone at a particular point of time, 
and it takes effort and resources to access, retrieve, and adapt it to one’s own 
use. Thus models of  externalities must perforce be models of  interaction be- 
tween different actors in the economy. We have, however, very few convincing 
models of  such interactions, and the identification problems are severe (see 
e.g., Charles Manski, 1993). Our measurement frameworks are not set up to 
record detailed origin and destination data for commodity flows, much less so 
for information flows. We  do have now a new tool for studying some of this: 
citations to patents and the scientific literature (see e.g., Jaffe et al., 1993), 
but anyone currently active in the e-mail revolution and participating in the 
conferences and workshops circuit knows how small this tip is relative to the 
informal-communications iceberg itself. 
14.7  The Glass Half-Full? 
After a long detour I come back to the original question: why don’t we know 
more about the sources of  productivity growth and the causes for its recent 
slowdown? Why does it feel as if the glass is still half-empty? First note that 
in a trivial sense we are doing better: the residual is smaller. But that is the bad 
news, not the good. It is smaller not because we have succeeded in providing a 
substantively fuller explanation of output growth, but rather because measured 
output growth declined, leaving some of these explanations in the dust. But we 
are also doing better substantively. We know much more about the components 
of  growth and where our measures are lacking. After decades of  work and 
contributions by Denison, Jorgenson, Kendrick, and many others, the concep- 
tual and measurement underpinnings of the growth accounts are in much better 
shape today. We  now  have extensive micro data on firms, their productivity, 
their R&D expenditures, and other variables. We have more data on individual 
investments in education and training, and we also have more asset detail on 
capital formation. More international data are now available, with the OECD 
both collecting R&D data and computing TFP numbers for many countries, 
and with Summers and Heston (1991) providing comparable real GNP num- 
bers for many countries. Finally, we have much more computing power and 
better econometric techniques and frameworks for attacking many of the prob- 
lems that arise in the analysis of such data. So what is still missing? 
We  are caught up in a mixture of  unmeasurement, mismeasurement, and 
unrealistic expectations. The productivity situation is both better than we think 
and also worse. It is likely that there have been significant unmeasured produc- 
tivity advances in many  of  the service sectors (Bresnahan, 1986; Baily and 
Gordon, 1988). Moreover, rising R&D investment rates in the mid-1980s and 
the recent rise in the number of patent applications augur well for the future. 
Also, productivity growth rates are probably underestimated even in the “mea- 
surable” sectors because they are based on “book value” estimates of physical- 368  Chapter 14 
and human-capital stocks and do not reflect the capital losses-the  obsoles- 
cence that occurred, first as the result of the various energy-price shocks, and 
later as the result of increased international competition and the melting away 
of much of  the previously existing monopoly rents to both types of  capital. 
That is actually bad news. We  are not as wealthy as we thought, but productiv- 
ity growth, based on the lower remaining levels of  input, is probably higher 
than we have measured it, 
A cautionary remark needs to be added here: productivity growth contri- 
butes to the potential for welfare, but it is not the same thing. Welfare can move 
in the opposite direction if the resources released by  productivity growth do 
not find adequate employment in other, economically valuable, activities (in- 
cluding leisure). Also the physical, economic, and political environments can 
change, both positively and negatively, overwhelming the productivity 
So even though I have been focusing on it here tonight, it is not the be-all of 
economic welfare. But as George Bernard Shaw used to say when he was ac- 
cused of money-grubbing: “Yes, I know that money is not happiness, but it is 
a pretty good substitute.” 
Nevertheless, the issues I have been discussing here tonight are important. 
Much depends on whether the “truth” is closer to the upper (“measurable”) 
line in Figure 14.1, or the lower one. The country’s mood is affected by  bad 
data and incorrect perceptions. Are we really not much better off than we were 
in the 1960s?  Would we really like to exchange the commodity assortment we 
have today for that of  yesteryear? Our health system, warts and all? The air 
pollution? The civil-rights situation? The fear of  nuclear war? These are not 
just idle intellectual curiosities. They affect what we feel about ourselves and 
the future. 
Returning to the topic of  technical change, our expectations of  what eco- 
nomics can deliver here may also be excessive. It is unlikely that we can have 
a fully “endogenous” theory of technical change. Yes, both the rate and direc- 
tion of inventive activity are subject to economic influences and analysis. So 
also is the diffusion of innovations. But the outcome of inventive activity is not 
really predictable. True “innovation” is an innovation. If  it were knowable in 
advance it would not be one, and the innovators would not be able to collect 
any rents. In that sense it is futile to expect that we could control it fully or 
predict it well.” Given the fundamental uncertainties entailed in the creative 
act, in invention, and in innovation, there is no reason to expect the fit of our 
models to be high or for the true residual to disappear. We should, however, be 
able to “explain” it better ex post even if we cannot predict it. 
23. Between 1970 and 1989, average hours of  work per worker went down by 7 percent, air 
pollution went down significantly, and the crime rate came close to doubling (Baily et al., 1993). 
Of course, these data are also problematic (see Scott Boggess and John Bound, 1993). 
24. “The set of opportunities for innovation at any moment are determined by what the physical 
laws of the world really are and how much has already been learned and is therefore ‘accidental’ 
from the viewpoint of economics” (Arrow, 1969 p. 35). 369  Productivity, R&D, and the Data Constraint 
The metaphor of the glass half-empty is also misleading. As we fill it, the 
glass keeps growing. A major aspect of  learning is that the unknown keeps 
expanding as we learn. This should be looked at positively. It is much better 
this way-especially  for those of us who are engaged in research! 
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